The probabilistic expectancies we form about others from very limited information are more accurate than we would expect.
Ambady and Rosenthal ( 1992 )
The American presidential race in 1936 was a referendum on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal economic policies. Roosevelt, running for his second term, would win what was up until then the greatest electoral landslide since the beginning of the United States' two-party system in the 1850s, winning all but eight of the 531 electoral votes, and winning 27,747,636 votes to Alfred Landon's-his Republican rival-16,679,543 (New York Times, "Alf Landon," 1987) . The presidential race between Roosevelt and Landon was also the beginning of the modern era of political polling-which started with a veritable fiasco. The Literary Digest, a venerable magazine and, perhaps, the most prestigious pollster of public opinions in those days, predicted two months before the election: "Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, Republican nominee for President, has better than a two-to-one lead over his Democratic opponent, President Roosevelt, in the first tabulated returns from the Literary Digest's 10,000,000 ballot public sentiment test poll on Presidential candidates" ("Landon Is Leading," 1936) egregiously botched prediction was based on a "straw poll": Although it mailed postcards to 10 million people, and received a whopping 2.2 million in return, it had surveyed its own readers, as well as people from two readily available lists of registered automobile owners and telephone users. In 1936, however, millions of Roosevelt supporters were too poor to be able to afford a magazine subscription or a phone, let alone an automobile. The Literary Digest's sample was therefore highly unrepresentative.
(p.262) "In the waning days of the 1936 presidential election, a young man from Princeton, New Jersey, … was becoming increasingly distressed.… He suffered from insomnia, he sucked on his unlit cigarettes, he worried incessantly that he had done something wrong and that his reputation and financial solvency were about to be destroyed" (Moore, 1995, p. 31) . The nervous young man was the director of the newly founded American Institute of Public Opinion, George Gallup.
Gallup understood that the famed Digest poll was heading for a disastrous cropper. Gallup brashly announced that the Digest would be wrong in the 1936 election. Using the replies of at most 5,000 representatively sampled respondents, 0.23% of the size of the Digest's poll, he predicted Roosevelt's landslide victory. The Literary Digest went out of business; the "Gallup poll" soon became a household word.
Covering a seemingly boundless variety of topics, contemporary pollsters from Gallup, the Pew Center, and Harris Interactive sample people's opinions, beliefs, preferences, customs, and morals. Probing a small but representative section of the population, they aim to infer what most of us think and feel. The thesis of this chapter is that canvassing samples of people to infer and to predict characteristics of the social world at large is not the prerogative of the pollsters. Like Gallup's interviewers, the human mind can also roam through its personal social spaces to sample instances and garner information, enabling it to make inferences about the social world. There are, however, important differences between professional and the mind's intuitive polling: The mind's samples-drawn from the external social world or from memory-are minute, relative to the thousands of respondents in Gallup polls. Furthermore, the mind's sample is an unrepresentative one, because it is drawn from a person's social environment, and people tend to know others who are more similar to themselves than to a randomly drawn person (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) . How do people make inferences about the behavior and characteristics of others based on instances sampled from their social environment? And how accurate are the strategies that people might use-given the limitations of the samples available to an individual mind mentioned above?
In what follows, we will describe the rationale and the social rationality of instance-based inference. Moreover, we will propose the social-circle heuristic (Pachur, Rieskamp, & Hertwig, 2012) , which people could use for making predictions about their social world based on limited search. We will examine the prescriptive and descriptive accuracy of the heuristic, its ecological rationality and boundary conditions, and will explore different domains (such as norm and attitude formation) in which the heuristic might guide our social reasoning. Traditionally, public opinion-for instance, prior to electionsis measured by probing voters' intentions with questions such as this: "Assuming that Election Day were to take place this coming Sunday, which party would you vote for?" Although representative polls based on such questions are generally useful, pollsters nevertheless frequently find that their survey results diverge from people's actual behavior in the voting booth ("Will there be an 'Obama effect? ' "; Elder, 2007) . But if explicit voting intentions do not predict people's behavior very well, what does? Analyses by Noelle-Neumann offer a surprising answer (e.g., Noelle-Neumann, 1991; NoelleNeumann & Petersen, 2004) . She found that measures that assess the "climate of opinion"-that is, respondents' beliefs about how others will vote-are a better predictor of the respondents' behavior than their intentions ("Regardless of your personal opinion, do you think most people … are holding a favorable opinion of … party, or don't you think so?"; NoelleNeumann, 1977, p. 157) . Noelle-Neumann's observation foreshadowed the success of prediction markets, with markets not taking a reading of whom people intend to vote for but of who they think will win, and cash wagered indicating the strength of those beliefs (e.g., Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) .
The results of Noelle-Neumann suggest that our behavior is strongly influenced by our beliefs and judgments about others. How do people judge the behavior and characteristics of others? One possibility is that, similar to polling institutes, individuals draw a sample from their own social environment and make predictions based on their personal polling results. Such intuitive polling might serve social rationality in several respects. First, probing one's social world is one way of forming a representation of the world's social texture. Second, based on these representations, a person can predict others' beliefs, preferences, and attitudes, and, ultimately, their behavior. Third, judgments about other people's beliefs and behaviors allow individuals to coordinate their own behavior with the behavior of others as well as with social expectations, standards, and norms.
Inferences about social environments can be drawn using either social or nonsocial information. Take the example of a person who attempts to predict which of two soft drinks is more popular. Nonsocial information would be cues such as the prevalence of media ads promoting one or the other, or whether a new variation of the product (e.g., low sugar, new flavor) was introduced recently. To the extent that these indicators are correlated with actual product popularity, they can act as probabilistic cues to infer the relative popularity of the two drinks. There is a large variety of strategies, such as unlikely to be representative, its characteristics will be imperfect predictors of the characteristics of the population; nevertheless, akin to nonsocial cues, the prevalence of behaviors that people observe in their own samples are correlated with the prevalence of the behaviors in the population. The magnitude of this correlation is one important factor for the success of the mind's polling strategy.
But how do we poll our social world? One possible strategy would be to try to retrieve as many instances as possible from our social environment and aggregate the information in this sample. For example, Hertwig, Pachur, and Kurzenhäuser (2005) obtained evidence that people make judgments about the relative frequency of health risks based on the total number of relevant instances they can recall among their family, friends, and acquaintances. However, people may not always strive for an exhaustive retrieval and instead limit their information search using a simplifying heuristic. Next, we
propose such a simple heuristic, the social-circle heuristic, which models how people might judge the prevalence of others' beliefs, preferences, characteristics, or behavior in the population.
The Social-Circle Heuristic
The social-circle heuristic can be used to make inferences about our social environment; it can answer questions such as which of two movies, or which of two soft drinks (say, CocaCola or Pepsi) is more popular overall, which of two political parties will receive more votes, or which of two behaviors is more frequent (and thus apt) in a given situation. Unlike heuristics such as tit-for-tat, the social-circle heuristic is not a heuristic that navigates a social interaction in which the outcome of a decision also depends on the decision(s) of (an)other person(s). There is no interdependency between the decision or judgment of several persons using the social-circle heuristic. Therefore the social-circle heuristic is a tool for "games against nature" (chapter 1), in which a person needs to make inferences about (social) nature (e.g., the prevalence of behaviors) in order to achieve his ends.
The Mind as an Intuitive Pollster: Frugal Search in Social Spaces heuristic's search in memory is limited. Importantly, the search follows a systematic order that rests on the welldocumented fact that social networks tend to display a hierarchical structure consisting of discrete subgroups (e.g., Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Milardo, 1992; Zhou, Sornette, Hill, & Dunbar, 2005 ; see also chapter 7). Specifically, the socialcircle heuristic assumes that the structure of a person's social network (i.e., the external social world) provides the blueprint for the internal search process for relevant carriers of information-consistent with the increasing evidence of a link between search processes in the external world and in the internal world of memory (e.g., Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2008; Pirolli & Card, 1999) . Moreover, the heuristic's exploitation of social structures is consistent with Hills and Pachur's (2012) finding that search in social memory is guided by links in a person's social network.
As illustrated in Figure 9 -1, it is assumed that an inference about the relative prevalence of two event categories is based on the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) if the name of only one of the categories is recognized. If both are unrecognized, the inference will be made by guessing. The social-circle heuristic applies if the names of both categories are recognized. How does the heuristic's search through the social space proceed? Figure 9 -1 represents subgroups in the social network as circles, and the heuristic is assumed to sequentially probe them for critical instances. Based on the well-established phenomenon that people often rely on information about themselves when making inferences about the prevalence of behaviors and characteristics in the population (the so-called false-consensus effect; see, e.g., Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) , the social-circle heuristic starts by considering information about the "self." The self thus represents the starting point for the sampling process (circle 1).
What are the next circles? There are at least two dimensions underlying the structure of a person's social network that could guide further search: altruism and frequency of contact.
Altruism typically manifests in kin (Hamilton, 1964a (Hamilton, , 1964b and in reciprocal relationships (Singer, 1981) . Adapting altruism as the structuring dimension yields three circles beyond the self-circle: family (circle 2); friends (circle 3); and acquaintances (circle 4), with family relating to kin relationships, and friends and acquaintances to non-kin reciprocal relationships. Alternatively, a person's social network can be structured according to frequency of contact.
This structure acknowledges that the people in one's close social proximity are not necessarily family members but may be, for instance, friends or colleagues whom one sees daily.
Analyzing the frequency of contact with one's social network members on a daily basis, one finds robust regularities in social environments (chapter 7 The socialcircle heuristic thus conceptualizes an individual's social network in terms of circles with increasing scope, with smaller circles being more "socially proximal" to the center of the network: the self (see Kahn & Antonucci, 1980; Moreno, 1936) . 1 Based on these two alternative structures of the social environment (i.e., altruism and frequency of contact), we distinguish two variants of the social-circle heuristic. Both can be expressed in terms of the following building blocks:
Search rule: Search the social circles for occurrences of the target events (e.g., people who drink Pepsi and Coca-Cola), proceeding sequentially through the circles, starting with the first circle ("self"). Based on the altruism structure, the heuristic will next examine which of the two soft drinks is the preferred brand among one's family members (if they consume any). If this circle does not discriminate between the soft drinks' popularity, the circle of "friends" will be polled, and so on. If the retrieved instances in none of the circles favor one soft drink over the other, the decision maker is assumed to either recruit cue-based strategies or resort to guessing.
The two variants of the social-circle heuristic differ in how search moves through a one's social network. According to the first variant (the altruism structure), search proceeds from the self to people to whom we are genetically related, and then to people outside the family with whom we have reciprocal relationships (cf. Hills & Pachur, 2012) . The rationale of this order is that we are likely to have the most reliable, extensive, and easily retrievable knowledge about ourselves, our family members, and close friends with whom we cooperate (Henrich & Henrich, p. 2007, p. 58) . According to the second variant (the frequency of contact structure), in contrast, search proceeds from the self to people with whom we have frequent contacts (e.g., Hill & Dunbar, 2003) . The rationale of this search order is that frequency of contact has been demonstrated to be a key determinant of the retrieval probability of memory records (Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998 Is the heuristic able to make accurate judgments by using only limited information and based on noncompensatory information processing? To answer this, we evaluated the performance of the social-circle heuristic in a competition that pitted it against two other inference models, both of which also process instances of the target categories (rather than cues) but often use considerably more information than the social-circle heuristic. The competition was implemented in a computer simulation. The task that the models had to solve was to infer which of two event categories has more instances in the population. If no inference could be made based on the number of instances sampled, a random guess was implemented.
The Competitors
Perhaps the most prominent descriptive inference strategy that makes judgments based on recalled instances is the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973 (Schwarz et al., 1991) , and number of sexual partners (Brown & Sinclair, 1999) . Tversky and Kahneman's exposition of the heuristic is consistent with two different mechanisms: one that rests on frequency (p.269) (i.e., the number of actually recalled instances) and the other on the ease of recall (see Sedlmeier, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 1998) . We focus on the first mechanism, and we make use of an implementation that Hertwig et al. (2005) called availability-by-recall. Like the social-circle heuristic, availability-by-recall assumes that search is limited insofar as it unfolds within the bounds of a person's social network, which Hertwig et al. (2005) defined as consisting of the focal person and his or her family, friends, and acquaintances. Within these bounds, availability-by-recall assumes that all recallable instances are considered and no specific order is assumed for their retrieval. As a consequence, availability-by-recall is compensatory insofar as, for instance, the frequency of instances in the family circle can be compensated by the frequency of instances in the friends circle. Availability-by-recall predicts that the category with the higher number of occurrences in one's social network is more frequent in the target population. In Hertwig et al.'s investigation (2005; Study 2) of how and how well people judge the mortality and incidence rates of various diseases, almost half of respondents were classified as users of availability-by-recall (see also Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012) .
The third inference strategy in our competition is a sampling model instantiating Wald's sequential analysis (see Wald, 1947) . To infer whether event category A or B occurs more frequently in the population, Wald's rule samples "social agents" sequentially, examines whether they belong to one of the event categories, and terminates information search as soon as sufficient support for a particular hypothesis has been accumulated. Specifically, the model considers three hypotheses: (a) that instances of event category A occur more frequently than instances of event category B (H 1A ); (b) that B occurs more frequently than A (H 1B ); and (c) that both event categories have the same number of instances (H 0 ). To evaluate these hypotheses, Wald's rule samples pairs of agents sequentially and after each pair compares the accumulated evidence relative to two thresholds representing the two directed hypotheses (i.e., H 1A and H 1B ). As soon as the evidence reaches one of the thresholds, sampling is terminated and the respective hypothesis accepted with the desired level of confidence. In our simulation, the probability α of falsely accepting hypotheses H 1A or H 1B was set at 0.05, and the probability β of falsely accepting the null hypothesis (i.e., H 0 ) was set at 0.10. 3 In addition to these error probabilities, Wald's rule requires the specification of two (p.270) environmental parameters: first, the expected relative frequency of instances of an event category, π, in the population. We set π equal to the median relative frequency of all event categories in the respective environment (see below).
The second was the effect size (Δ) by which the proportions of instances of two event categories A and B differ. We considered two separate levels of Δ, one for the effect size required for H 1A to be accepted, Δ A ; and one for H 1B to be accepted, Δ B . We set Δ A as the median difference in relative frequency (in the respective environment) among the pairs of event categories that are more frequent than π; Δ B was set as the median difference among the pairs of event categories that are less frequent than π. Further details concerning our implementation of Wald's rule can be found in Box 9-1.
In sum, the purpose of the simulation was to examine how well the social-circle heuristic, using only a subset of the available information, performs relative to availability-by-recall and Wald's rule. Availability-by-recall uses all (recallable) information in a person's social network. In contrast, Wald's rule can also sample instances beyond the bounds of a person's social network, thus representing primarily a statistical benchmark.
The Environments
We tested the strategies in two different environments. Each environment consisted of ten different event categories (e.g., ten infectious diseases), which represented the reference class (see Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991 categories differed in their frequency of occurrence. These frequencies were implemented across a population of agents.
Each agent was an instance of at most one event category. At the same time, agents made inferences regarding which event category was more frequent in the population of agents in a total of 45 pair comparisons (i.e., the complete pair comparison of the ten event categories). The two environments differed in terms of the frequency distributions across the different event categories. In the first environment, the frequency distribution tracks the distribution of occurrences of the ten most common notifiable infectious diseases in Germany (see Hertwig et al., 2005) . As environment, which we created artificially, the frequency distribution is considerably flatter, with frequency decreasing linearly from the most to the least frequent event category.
Each environment was implemented as a toroidal grid (i.e., a matrix where each cell at the border is connected to the cell on the same row or column, respectively, on the opposite side of the matrix), in which each cell represented a social agent that could be an instance of an event category (e.g., a disease; an agent could not be an instance of more than one event category). In both environments, the instances of the event categories were distributed randomly across the agents in the population. The (p.272)
The Mind as an Intuitive Pollster: Frugal Search in Social Spaces Wald's rule infers for each pair comparison whether event category A is more frequent (H 1A ), category B is more frequent (H 1B ), or whether both event categories are equally frequent (H 0 ). At each step during the sampling process, a pair of agents is drawn at random (without replacement) from the population, and the "category value" of each agent in the pair is examined. If the pair discriminates between the event categories-that is, one of the agents (but not the other) is an instance of one of the event categories-the variable n (the number of discriminating cases) will be increased by 1; otherwise another pair of agents is sampled. The variable y (representing the accumulated evidence for the hypotheses) will be increased by 1 if one of the agents (but not the other) is an instance of category A and decreased by one if one of the agents (but not the other) is an Figure 9 -2: Frequency distribution of the ten events in the computer simulation, derived from the distribution of the ten infectious diseases with the highest annual incidence rate in Germany. instance of category B. The current value of y is compared to four critical values, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , and y 4 . These critical values at n are calculated as y 1 (n) = b × n + a 1 , y 2 (n) = b × n -a 0 , y 3 (n) = -b × n -a 0 and y 4 (n) = -b × n -a 1 , respectively,
Furthermore, π 1A is the probability that a pair of agents (sampled randomly) discriminates between the two event categories under H 1A and is calculated as π 1A = (π + Δ A ) × (1 -π). The corresponding probability π 1B is calculated as π 1B = (π -
were corrected by subtracting half of the surplus (i.e., (π 1A + π 1B )/2) from each (see Bortz, Lienert, & Böhnke, 2008) .
Depending on how the current value of y compares to the four thresholds at n, information search is either continued or stopped. Specifically, if y(n) 〉 y 1 (n), H 1A will be accepted; if
, H 1B will be accepted; and if y 2 (n) 〉 y(n) 〉 y 3 (n), H 0 will be accepted. Otherwise, information search is continued and the above steps are repeated until one of the conditions is met. If none of the conditions is met after all 2,500 agents in the population have been sampled, then H 0 will be accepted.
As Figure et al., 2005) . Note that in this simulation, the circle structure could represent either the altruism or the contact frequency structures. The social-circle heuristic searches through circles 1 through 4 and terminates search when one circle discriminates. How extensive is the poll that the social-circle heuristic takes? In the simulation, the heuristic looks up, on average, 24.7 and 12.3 agents before drawing an inference in the J-shaped and uniform environments, respectively. In both environments, availability-by-recall looks up all 41 agents in an agent's network. On the assumption that rather than looking up all agents in the accessed sample space (non-directed retrieval), only those are sampled that represent an instance of the event categories in question (directed retrieval), the social-circle heuristic looks up, on average, 1.4 and 1.8 agents, compared with 12.2 and 8.5 agents for the availability-by-recall heuristic in the J-shaped and uniform environments, respectively. Put differently, the social-circle heuristic considers only 11.3% (J- Taken together, the results suggest that overall there is a tradeoff between accuracy and frugality: The more frugal the strategy (the fewer agents that are looked up), the less accurate the inferences. However, an interesting finding emerges when we distinguish between the two environmental distributions. In the uniform environment, the social-circle heuristic's frugality came at the price of inferior accuracy, whereas in the J-shaped environment no such frugalityaccuracy tradeoff occurred (relative to availability-by-recall). That is, the extent to which a fast and frugal polling method can forsake the tradeoff between accuracy and frugality depends on the structure of the environment. Both heuristics were clearly outperformed by Wald's rule. Its predictive superiority, however, comes at the expense of enormous sampling efforts. On average, it sampled between 20 and 30 times as many agents as the social-circle heuristic, thus benefiting from a sample size that lies beyond the bounds of a person operating under constraints of time, knowledge, and memory. To better understand why the social-circle heuristic's performance depends on the structure of the environment, we conducted another set of simulations. Specifically, we determined how the level of accuracy (on the 45 pair comparisons) changes with increasing sample size when samples are drawn randomly from the network. When the sample did not discriminate between a pair of event categories, random choice was implemented. Figure 9-4 shows the results, separately, for the J-shaped and uniform environments. The dotted lines in the graphs indicate the accuracy achieved with a random sample of size 500. Three observations are of relevance: First, in both environments, the information gain as a function of sampling more agents is subject to a diminishing return (cf. Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008) . Second, how quickly the return diminishes depends on the environment: In the J-shaped environment, accuracy increases steeply at very small sample sizes but then levels off.
Specifically, to match the gain of 14.3 percentage points achieved by increasing the sample size from 0 (p.275) (accuracy: 50%) to 5 (accuracy: 64.3%), one has to boost the sample size from 5 to 50 agents. Relatedly, the largest single gain, 8.7 percentage points, occurs by increasing the sample size from 0, when only random guesses are possible, to the smallest sample size of 1. In the uniform environment, by contrast, the gain of 13.3 percentage points achieved by increasing the sample size from 0 to 5 can be matched by boosting the sample size from 5 to 20. The accuracy gained by increasing the sample size from 0 to 1 amounts to only 3.6 percentage points. Third, we compared the score (black dots in Figure 9 -4 Panels A and B) achieved by the social-circle heuristic-which relies on ordered search-with that achieved by random search; that is, when drawing a random sample of the average size required by the social-circle heuristic. In both environments, the social-circle heuristic surpasses that accuracy; the dots lie above the curve, suggesting that the heuristic discards redundant information. In other words, ordered search with conditional search extension (as implemented by the social-circle heuristic) is better than random search. To conclude, our analysis suggests that in an environment with a J-shaped frequency distribution, the benefit of considering additional information diminishes quickly, after some large initial gains. The computer simulations suggest that, depending on the environment, the social-circle heuristic can be an efficient cognitive tool for judging relative event frequencies. Do people also use it? We next report an empirical study in which we tested how well the social-circle heuristic can predict people's actual inferences in comparison to availability-by-recall. We asked 40 students to judge the relative frequencies of the 24 et al., 2005; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006) . For that purpose, we constructed a set of all possible 276 pairs of the diseases, and the task was to infer which one of two infectious diseases has a higher annual incidence rate in
Germany. Subsequently, each participant indicated for each disease (a) whether he had heard of it previously (i.e., recognized it) and (b) how many, if any, people in each of his social circles-defined as self, family, friends, and acquaintances, respectively-had been affected by the disease. At first, we focused on the social-circle heuristic based on the altruism structure. Using participants' reported knowledge of instances of the diseases in their social circles, we derived individual-specific and item-specific predictions for both the social-circle heuristic and availability-by-recall. Because
Wald's rule may require sample sizes that exceed the size of most people's networks, it is not considered as a descriptive model here.
In addition to examining the descriptive accuracy of the socialcircle heuristic, the empirical test allowed us to examine its inferential accuracy under real-world conditions. In the environments used in the simulations, the density of instances (i.e., most agents in the population were instances of one of the event categories) was relatively high. As a consequence, the social-circle heuristic often stopped information search at early circles, allowing us to test the heuristic's accuracy when it considers only very little information. In addition, the instances were distributed randomly across the agents in the population. In real-world environments, however, (p.277) these conditions may not necessarily hold. For instance, the density of occurrences of diseases in a population is lower than in our simulations (because infectious diseases are usually rare events). In addition, infectious diseases are typically not randomly distributed among people, but instead occur in clusters, contrary to the random distribution of instances on the grid in the simulation. How does the heuristic fare as a descriptive model under these conditions? Across the 24 infectious diseases, respondents reported having encountered, on average, 4.2 instances in their social network. Due to this paucity of experience, the social-circle heuristic and availability-by-recall made, on average, predictions in a subset of 11.1% and 10.5% of all 276 pair comparisons, respectively. For 7 of the 40 participants, neither strategy made a single prediction (because these participants did not recall any instances of the diseases in their networks).
For each participant, we computed, separately for the socialcircle heuristic and availability-by-recall, the percentage of inferences that were in line with the respective strategy (considering all cases in which the strategy did not have to guess and where both diseases were recognized). The socialcircle heuristic correctly predicted, on average, 77% of the inferences, slightly less than availability-by-recall, which predicted 78% of the inferences correctly (Kruskal-Wallis test: z = 1.59, p = 0.12, r = 0.28). In other words, both heuristicsone assuming truncated search, the other exhaustive searchpredicted actual inferences nearly equally well. One may suspect that the heuristics are almost indistinguishable because-due to the paucity of experience-the social-circle heuristic always had to search up to the final circle to find instances, thus functionally behaving like availability-by-recall. This was not the case. Of all 1,217 inferences (summed across all participants) in which the social-circle heuristic made a prediction, 11%, 29%, 26%, and 34% of the inferences were made on the basis of the first, second, third and fourth circles, respectively. As a consequence, the social-circle heuristic was, on average, more frugal than availability-by-recall, with 1.2 and 1.8 retrieved instances per inference, respectively (t(32) = 3.54, p = 0.01).
(p.278) Which Strategy Predicts the Environmental Criterion Best?
What price does the social-circle heuristic's frugality exact? To answer this question, we determined the accuracy of the social-circle heuristic and availability-by-recall, separately for each participant. Specifically, we calculated the number of correct inferences of the environmental criterion (i.e., the actual relative event frequencies of the diseases) by each strategy, divided by the number of inferences in which it made So far, we have focused on strategies that embody the notion that people behave like intuitive pollsters who probe their social networks for occurrences of the events in question, and conceive of people as carriers of information. As mentioned above, however, there is an alternative approach to judging frequencies of social events: reliance on probabilistic cues (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006 The six strategies were tested against each other in the context of judging the popularity of different sports in Germany. A sport's "popularity" was defined as "the number of registered club members" (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002) . In comparison to infectious diseases, in the sports environment the frequency of instances is relatively high. Therefore, people should be able to retrieve more instances in the process of making an inference. The strategies were tested against each other for all 300 possible pair comparisons of the 25 most popular sports in Germany. Forty participants were presented with the pairs and asked to judge for each pair which of the two sports was more popular. After making these inferences, participants indicated for each sport how many, if any, people in their social network were members of a respective sports club, allowing us to derive the predictions for the instancebased strategies. On average, participants reported 25.6 instances of sport club members (across all sports); substantially more instances than for the infectious diseases studied above. As a consequence, the social-circle heuristic, the social-circle heuristic F , and availability-by-recall made unambiguous predictions in, on average, 56%, 57%, and 53% of the cases, respectively. In addition, participants reported which of the four network circles (self, family, friends, and acquaintances) these instances belonged to and how frequently they typically had contact with them. Contact information allowed us to assign each recalled instance to one expected under random guessing, the participant was classified as "guessing." Figure 9 -5 shows the resulting classification distribution. Whereas no participant was classified as guessing, about two-thirds were classified as users of an instance-based strategy. Overall, availability-byrecall (23%) and the social-circle heuristic (25%) were the two strategies used by the largest number of participants. The numbers for the other strategies were clearly smaller in comparison, with, for instance, 17% for tallying, 17% for WADD, and 11% for the social-circle heuristic F .
To summarize, when inferring the frequency of behaviors and characteristics of others, people seem to be more likely to consider instances in their proximal social spaces than to rely on probabilistic cues. In addition, we found that the dimension that appears to structure search and retrieval of instances is not frequency of contact, but kin and reciprocal altruism.
How Ecologically Rational Is Reasoning by Instances?
Inference about event frequencies based on knowledge of concrete instances has in the past often been equated with biased judgments What characteristics of an environment determine whether the social-circle heuristic succeeds or fails? This question concerns the ecological rationality of the heuristic-that is, the fit between the heuristic and the structure of the environment (cf. chapter 1). As Figure 9 -4 Panels A and B demonstrate, the degree of skewness in the frequency distribution is of key importance. In many real-world domains, frequency distributions are such that for very few event categories there is a very large number of instances, whereas for most event categories there is only a moderate number of instances (e.g., Bak, 1996) . Take, for example, the actual frequency distribution of infectious diseases used in our first study (Figure 9-3 ; see Table 1 in Hertwig et al., 2005) : One single disease-gastroenteritis-occurs more frequently than all other diseases combined. By comparison, the domain investigated in the second study, the frequency distribution of people in sports clubs, is considerably less skewed. One way to quantify skewness is to express the distribution of a class of n objects on the target variable y as a power function y = x -α, where x refers to the rank of an object (with the n objects ranked according to the target variable in descending order from 1, …, n). The skewness of a distribution is the value of α that yields the best fit, with a higher α indicating a higher skewness. In Figure 9 -6, the distributions of the infectious diseases and sports environments are plotted on a log-log scale (where a power function translates into a straight line), showing that the distribution was considerably more skewed for the diseases (α = 4.07; R 2 = 0.93) than for the sports (α = 1.36; R 2 = 0.95).
Why does the skewness of the frequency distribution matter?
One possible explanation is that it affects the circle validities, Figure 9-6: The distributions of frequencies in the disease and sport environments, plotted on a log-log scale.
the proportion of correct inferences when an inference is made based solely on the number of the instances within a given circle. The validity of the "self" circle equals the proportion of the pair comparisons in which a decision maker is an instance of category A but not of category B, and in which category A is more frequent than B in the population. Analogously, the validities of the other circles equal the proportion of the pair comparisons in which the number of instances, retrieved by the decision maker, of categories A and B is unequal, and in which the more frequent category within the circle is also more frequent in the population. Table 9 -1 lists, for all four circles, the circle validities and discrimination rates (the relative frequency with which a circle discriminates between two event categories) for the highly skewed disease environment (for both the computer simulation and the empirical study). In the simulated and the experimental data, the validity of the self circle (based on a sample with n = 1) is extremely high; namely, 96% and 91%, respectively. The validity decreases-slightly in the simulated data and substantially in the empirical data-across larger circles, whereas the discrimination rates increase. In the sports environment, in contrast, the circle validities are considerably lower overall and, if anything, increase from the smallest to the largest circle (Table  9 -2).
Why does the skewness of the distribution affect the circle validities? In highly skewed environments, the initial circles will discriminate mainly in those cases where one event category is considerably more frequent than the other. The effect sizes (i.e., the objective (p.284) Figure 9 -6: The distributions of frequencies in the disease and sport environments, plotted on a log-log scale. difference in frequency) are thus very large. Inferences involving comparisons between event categories of medium or low frequencies usually cannot be determined based on the initial circles-because they are too rare to occur in the "self" or "family" circle-and need to be referred to more encompassing circles. That is, in highly skewed environments, the costs of increased sampling error incurred with small sample sizes is offset because only comparisons with very large effect sizes-which are unlikely to be harmed by sampling error-are decided based on initial circles. In less skewed environments, are usually much smaller, and sampling error will often hamper the ability to correctly decide these comparisons.
Benefits of Reliance on Small Samples
Recently, it has been argued that reliance on small samples has a number of important benefits, such as the early detection of useful binary correlations (e.g., Fiedler & Kareev, 2006; Kareev, 2000 Kareev, , 2005 but see Juslin & Olsson, 2005) , or the amplification of differences and therefore reduced difficulty in making a choice (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008 , 2010 . The social-circle heuristic and availability-by-recall rely on small samples by merely polling a person's social network or slices of it. 7 Might this focus on small samples of personally experienced instances be beneficial? It has been argued that distortions in estimates of event frequencies are caused, for instance, by "disproportionate exposure, memorability, or imaginability of various events" (Lichtenstein et al., 1978, p. 551) , assuming that the search space in memory extends far beyond a person's social network and includes a virtual circle, populated with incidents conveyed through the mass media (Lichtenstein et al., 1978) . Clearly, augmenting the search space in memory by a virtual circle comes at the price of systematic error simply because potential news or entertainment items are selected for their potential to captivate an audience (see, e.g., Combs & Slovic, 1979; Frost, Frank, & Maibach, 1997) . In contrast, sampling only within one's social network-although constraining the sample sizeguards one against the media's selection of rare, vivid, dramatic, emotional, and sensational events (cf. Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012) .
Doubtless, reliance on small samples exacts risks. One such is the risk of being miscalibrated to "clumpiness" in time or space. Illnesses, for instance, often occur in spatial patches or clusters ("hot spots"), such as leukemia near nuclear installations, or increased rates of diseases in underserved areas (e.g., Antunes & Waldman, 2002 Smallman-Raynor & Cliff, 2007) . Clumped spatial or skewed age distributions can compromise the accuracy of instance-based strategies such as the social-circle heuristic. The "young" social network of adolescents, for instance, may under-represent the occurrence of old age diseases such as Alzheimer's. By the same logic, the "old" social networks of elderly people may over-represent the occurrence of these diseases (and under-represent diseases mainly prevalent among the young, such as measles).
Consistently, Benjamin and Dougan (1997; see also Benjamin, Dougan, & Buschena, 2001) found that people's estimates of various mortality risks were more in line with event frequencies in their age cohort than with those in the general population. Interestingly, we observed the same tendency in the sports study. Respondents' inferences about the popularity of various sports were somewhat better tuned to the frequencies in their age cohort (i.e., number of club members aged 27 years and younger) than to the population frequencies. When using the relative frequencies in the cohort rather than those in the entire population as a reference, participants' accuracies was somewhat higher, 64.3% versus 62.9%, t(39) = 1.7, p = 0.05 (one-tailed). But even this sampling bias may be a blessing in disguise. Despite the common notion that the "world is a village," people typically do not navigate in all social spheres. Therefore, as Benjamin and Dougan argued, being able to accurately estimate the event frequencies in the population may be less important than being calibrated to the events in one's proximal environment.
When Do People Refrain From Instance-Based Strategies?
The results reported here and in Hertwig et al. (2005) suggest that people often rely on instance-based strategies, and sometimes constrain their information search to very small sample sizes. But any heuristic has boundary conditions. What are those of the social-circle heuristic? First, as with other tools for probabilistic inferences (e.g., recognition heuristic, take-the-best), people are likely not to resort to instance-based strategies when they have direct, conclusive knowledge about the criterion (cf. Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Pachur & Hertwig, The Mind as an Intuitive Pollster: Frugal Search in Social Spaces & Juslin, 2006; Hamill, Wilson, & Nisbett, 1980; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975 (2001) proposed a model for the individual learning of social norms that is closely related to the social-circle heuristic. It consists of a search rule and a stopping rule specifying the sampling procedure within a person's social environment, and a decision rule, according to which the behavior of the majority of persons in the sample is adopted. By way of its stopping rule, the model attempts to reach a decision of how to behave based on as little information as possible. For that purpose, the heuristic first searches for information by checking the distribution F of behaviors within a particular radius, r, (or circle) around the person. The size of the radius indicates the size of the sample taken from the population.
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The initial value of r is chosen at random. Let us assume that the majority (say 60%, i.e., F(r) = 0.60) of the examined people altruistically offer their seat to an elderly person. The heuristic now extends the sample slightly (i.e., increases r by 1) to check whether this result is robust. If the recommendation from the larger sample is different (i.e., F(r+1) ≠ F(r)), the person expands the sample until the recommendation from one sample matches that of the next-larger sample. The recommended behavior is then adopted. If, however, the first step-that is, the comparison of the initial sample with the slightly larger sample-yields the same recommendation (i.e., levels of noise, defined as the degree to which a behavior is chosen at random rather than being derived from the distribution of behaviors in the sample. He observed that even with extreme noise, the final group of "circles" on which the agent based a decision was rather small, although no local stability emerged.
Epstein's (2001) model is ecologically rational in the sense that-like the social-circle heuristic-it adjusts the amount of information used to make a decision to the structure of the social environment. The key ecological characteristic here is the diversity of behaviors in the environment. The less diverse the behavior, the smaller the amount of information considered for the final judgment. resulting "forces" of the different opinions in the environment are compared, and that the opinion that has the greatest force is adopted. Social impact theory shares the common assumption of many theories of human behavior that conflicts are mastered by making tradeoffs, and that weighting and summing are the processes by which such tradeoffs can be made in a rational way (see Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006) . If, for instance, there is a conflict between the opinion expressed by an expert, and the opinion expressed by many laypeople, this conflict will be solved by trading-off the strength of an opinion and the number of opinion carriers.
There is, however, an alternative to the assumption that cognitive processes always compute tradeoffs in terms of weighting and summing of information. In the words of Lopes (1995): "Judgments that are captured algebraically by the idea of weight express themselves in individual choices by the order in which operations are carried out" (p. 203, italics in original). According to this view, people might master conflicts by simple sequential heuristics that avoid tradeoffs. Examples of such sequential heuristics are the take-the-best heuristic in probabilistic inference (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) , the priority heuristic in risky choice (Brandstätter et al., 2006) , and the social-circle heuristic in inference of event frequencies (Pachur, Rieskamp, & Hertwig, 2012) .
Can the social-circle heuristic-which relies on sequential processing-explain the regularities of social impact identified by Latané (1981) , which are usually assumed to result from the processes of summing and weighting? Take, for example, the effect of strength (authority) and immediacy of social impact. As it turns out, this effect follows from the architecture of the social-circle heuristic-specifically, from the assumption of limited search. So far we have considered social distance (operationalized as altruism and contact frequency, respectively) as the key dimension guiding search. In domains in which expertise matters, however, search within one's social network could also be ordered according to authority (or a combination of authority and social distance). If so, and if search is terminated once a social circle discriminates, opinion carriers with lower authority or with Again, this finding does not necessitate the summing of all opinions in one's social environment. After all-other things being equal-the higher the number of carriers of a particular opinion, the more likely it is that one of them is sampled before information search is stopped, irrespective of when search is stopped. To conclude, there is an alternative to the assumption that attitude formation should be modeled in terms of weighting and summing of all information. The emerging determinants on attitudes may directly follow from the architecture of the simple polling strategies with which people forage for information distributed in their proximal environments.
Conclusion
To infer quantities of the world, we can recruit nonsocial or social information. The members of our social networks afford us one important piece of social information-wittingly and unwittingly, they are carriers of information that we can exploit. Knowing that more people in a network drink CocaCola than Pepsi or that more endorse Obama than his Republican opponent can help us predict preferences in the population. Such naturally accessible information in social networks can be reaped using different instance-based heuristics. We considered two: the social-circle heuristic and availability-by-recall. They both appear to describe what a sizeable chunk of respondents do when asked to make inferences about event frequencies. The social-circle heuristic bets on substantially smaller slices of the social environment than availability-by-recall. This frugality works rather well in skewed environments but comes with a substantial price tag in uniform environments. In inferring quantities-including genuinely social quantities such as norms, attitudes, and preferences-the adaptive toolbox may be stacked not just with cue-based but also with instance-based inferential tools. The boundedly rational mind may prove to be also an intuitive pollster of its social environment. population frequency for the event category, e: Using t = 82 million for the population size of Germany, the statistics in Table 9 -3, and assuming that the number of recalled instances represents participants' accumulated experiences across a period of ten years (rather than one year, which the incidence rates refer to), we obtain an estimated network size c = 142.
) People differ in terms of the size of their social networks, and larger networks represent, ceteris paribus, the population more accurately. Therefore, it is possible that people with larger social networks may make more accurate inferences.
There was indeed such a tendency (r = 0.13, with network size estimated based on the scale-up methods described in Footnote 5 and using people's reported instance knowledge). This positive relationship disappeared once individual differences in discrimination rates were taken into account. That is, people with larger networks could retrieve more instances. As a consequence, their instances discriminated in more comparisons and required guessing in fewer cases than the sample instances of people with smaller networks, leading to a higher accuracy. Access brought to you by: Max-Planck Society
